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The transitional justice processes in Tunisia started since Ben Ali’s
overthrow in 2011 have been far-reaching. Questions have been raised,
however, about whether the responsible justice institutions have an
unfeasible mandate. These concerns are compounded by a lack of action
and suggest lessons for other countries emerging from post-
authoritarian contexts.
Ten years after the Tunisian revolution, the country still struggles with how to
deal with the legacy of violent and repressive rule. Following the fall of Zine el-
Abidine Ben Ali’s regime in 2011, Tunisia introduced a far-reaching transitional
justice project with strong international support. The project was intended to
deal with almost 60 years of authoritarian rule, uncovering, among other issues,
human rights violations, socio-economic crimes and marginalisation, and
providing recommendations on reforms in various areas such as administration,
the judiciary, the security sector, the media and the economy.
A central institution of this project was the Tunisian Truth and Dignity
Commission that took up its work in 2014 and ran until the end of 2018. A  nal
report was submitted to the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the President of
the Parliament in early 2019 and eventually published in the country’s o cial
journal in 2020. However, not much has happened since then and in early 2021 it
is unclear how the government plans to take up the truth commission’s
recommendations and implement measures such as a proposed reparations
programme. Some interview partners blame the all-overshadowing COVID-19
pandemic for slow progress on the issue, but political struggles have
continuously shaped and stalled the process. Nonetheless, especially at the
beginning, the Tunisian transitional justice project was often lauded for putting
previously peripheral issues, such as socio-economic injustice and corruption,
centre stage.
The danger of overpromising
While the far-reaching mandate addressed well Tunisia’s justice problems, it
came along with the danger of overpromising, since it did not  t with the
capacities of transitional justice institutions. Even before the truth commission
took up its work, different domestic and international actors have questioned
whether the mandate was feasible. It is noteworthy that even some of those
who were involved in setting up the project, and responsible for carrying out the
mandate, such as international consultants or truth commissioners, were
sceptical.
Corruption and socio-economic marginalisation were important pillars of
authoritarian rule and remain sources of injustice in Tunisia 10 years after the
revolution. Thus, it seems only logical that the Truth and Dignity Commission
had a mandate for dealing with these issues. However, my interview partners
during recent research did not all agree. A truth commissioner (who had recently
defected when I interviewed them) found that it would be too much for the truth
commission to deal with corruption. They argued for concentrating on more
‘traditional’ tasks of transitional justice institutions and to focus only on
repression:
‘I don’t understand why corruption is effectively put on the back of the TDC.
That means, the TDC should simply take care of victims of repression, in my
opinion, because the mandate is just too heavy.’
Including socio-economic issues in the mandate was even classi ed as a
populist move by another interview partner, a member of parliament.
Similarly, institutional reforms were and are still seen as essential to changing
repressive structures in the country. From this perspective it made sense to ask
the Truth and Dignity Commission to work on the issue and produce
recommendations. But similar to the corruption issue, truth commissioners felt
that this was too big of a task and that they lacked political guidance to be able
to ful l it.
Who pushed for the expansive mandate?
The ambitious mandate followed the ideal of a holistic approach to transitional
justice, promoted by international transitional justice professionals. One
interview partner claimed that his colleagues ‘preach[ed this approach] like a
gospel’ and different international organisations wanted the mandate to include
their pet issues.
However, domestic actors were also interested in a far-reaching mandate. My
interview partners mentioned two reasons: the fear of counter-revolution that
should be avoided by thoroughly dealing with the past; and the ambition to
design and implement an exemplary transitional justice project.
Broader implications for other transitional justice
projects in Africa and beyond
The Tunisian example points to a dilemma: addressing all relevant justice
problems may lead to an overloading of transitional justice institutions. While
this does not mean that one should be less ambitious in seeking justice for
violence, repression and socio-economic failures, it is necessary to be aware of
problems and trade-offs that can accompany such ambitious projects. Su cient
time and material resources are key, as is continuous (political) support. Thus, it
is important to consider how transitional justice projects  t into the broader
context of political transition – be it political struggles, economic challenges, or
simply a lot of expectations on the plate of countries undergoing political and
institutional change.
While the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice,
Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence has already recognised that
overloading may be an issue for countries emerging from con ict, the Tunisian
example shows that this may also be the case for post-authoritarian contexts.
This does not mean that people should be less ambitious when they demand
justice or set up transitional justice projects. Rather, it reminds us of the
balancing act between what would be desirable and what would be feasible.
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